War by another name: Destabilisation in Nicaragua and Mozambique

TY - JOUR

T1 - War by another name

T2 - Destabilisation in Nicaragua and Mozambique

AU - Thompson, Carol B.

N1 - Funding Information: Thompson Carol B. Department of Political Science at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles 4 1988 29 4 21 44 sagemeta-type Journal Article search-text 21 War by another name: destabilisation in Nicaragua and Mozambique SAGE Publications, Inc.1988DOI: 10.1177/030639688802900402 Carol B.Thompson Department of Political Science at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles Isabella Nunez is back to work at the health clinic. Six months ago she was kidnapped by the US-backed contras in Nicaragua and taken to Honduras where she was forced to work as a secretary for a contra leader; he repeatedly raped her. She was lucky to have escaped, for six of f the ten other health workers were killed. Now she is training new health workers to help the Sandinista government provide services to the people. Isabel Johane is also back at work in her village in Mozambique, but she is missing an ear and her brother is dead. The South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) had entered their village and randomly killed several, abducting others. Isabel was taken to a neighbouring camp, but when Frelimo liberated the area from the MNR, she returned to work in a clinic that has no medicine, no furniture, and the building itself has been damaged. In the policy of destabilisation, promoted by the US in Nicaragua and by South Africa in Mozambique, trained leaders such as health workers, agricultural extension workers and teachers are prime targets for the counter-revolutionaries. The major goal of destabilisation is to undermine the social transformations which are taking place, such as promoting preventive health care in rural areas that have never known health services. Newly trained young people represent a new way of life, the new hope, and they are the first prey. Since 1981 destabilisation has been a major foreign policy option of 2622 the Reagan Administration and of the Botha regimen By comparing the two approaches to destabilisation within two different regions, this study clarifies the strategy and goals of the policy and analyses foreign policy formulation of the two regional powers. Because the concept of destabilisation is comprehensive, a clear definition is necessary for the analysis. It refers to all kinds of efforts on the part of a powerful actor, short of open invasion, to weaken and eliminate another actor that for ideological, strategic, economic and political reasons is unacceptable, even if not constituting a direct security threat.' Not a Vietnam approach, which involves full-scale bombing and warfare, destabilisation seeks to destroy the government from within, to render a country ungovernable. It is implosion. To appear legitimate, sabotage is done by nationals of the target country or from neighbouring countries, not by the army of the destabiliser. Although both governments use the tactic throughout their regions, and this regional context will be discussed, the focus of this study is Nicaragua and Mozambique. For it is in Nicaragua and Mozambique that the full range of destabilisation tactics is employed, as an alternative to full-scale military invasion. Nicaragua is not Mozambique, and the US is not South Africa. The comparison will underline these differences, but also show both the strategic and tactical similarities of the destabilisation policies. The choice of the policy and the similarities do reveal collaboration between the US and South Africa. The US has supported South African apartheid economically and politically; it rarely protests against South African attacks on its neighbours, instead, often blaming the latter for provoking the attacks. South Africa is not an American puppet, but tacit approval and material support encourage apartheid aggression: the climate of bellicosity and interventionism diffused by Washington has encouraged other, junior, allies to seize their opportunities.2 Destabilisation as a policy choice The drive behind the policy of destabilisation can only partially be explained by classical theories of imperialism. Certainly, with the falling rate of profit at home, outside markets and investments are sought. However, with economic crisis at home, international dominance is weakened and control limited. The economy may need regional profitability and market outlets, but the government cannot afford to invade in order to bring the economic structures under more direct control. For South Africa, its repeated invasions of Angola and its war in Namibia make the cost of another invasion in Mozambique prohibitive and impractical; putting an army on two extreme borders is risky (and by 1985 the army was also needed in the townships). The US is spending 2723 unprecedented funds on conventional warfare and could 'afford' an invasion of Nicaragua, but two factors so far have deterred that. One is the lesson from Vietnam: it is easy to invade a country; it is not so easy to leave. The mobilisation of Nicaraguans guarantees a lengthy conflict if US troops go in. Further, mass organising in the US has rendered the political cost of an invasion too high. Americans do not support such a manoeuvre3 and are aware of the situation in Nicaragua (in contrast to Grenada, where most Americans were ignorant of its location, let alone the issues, when they awoke to the morning news of a 'successful' invasion). Destabilisation is chosen as a tactic, therefore, when the dominant country judges it cannot invade another, but it also cannot coexist. One reason given for declaring the new governments 'unacceptable' is the accusation that they are 'exporting revolution' to their neighbours. Although the US has repeatedly accused Nicaragua of supplying arms to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, there has been no evidence. On 13 January 1981, a week before Reagan took office, the US embassy in El Salvador stated that 100 Nicaraguan commandos had landed; the US ambassador to Nicaragua later admitted the landing was 'fictional'.~ In February 1981 a white paper was released to 'prove' arms were arriving in El Salvador from Nicaragua; several independent investigations established that most of the documents were forgeries. By 1984 even a CIA analyst said there were no verified reports of arms traffic and no interdictions since April 1981.5 Before 1984 Mozambique allowed the African National Congress (ANC) to traverse Mozambican territory on the way to South Africa; they have never allowed ANC bases. After the Nkomati Accord in 1984 ANC activities were strictly curtailed, but South African destabilisation continued. It became clear to both Nicaragua and Mozambique that their support of liberation forces in neighbouring countries was only an initial reason for the destabilisation ; the real target was their own governments, their own experiments in social transformation. The main goal of destabilisation is to destroy any attempts by the new government to take control of the domestic economy. To maintain the market and production relations under old patterns of dominance, the regional power has to show the nationals that the new system cannot work. Social and economic transformations are threatening examples to other states in the region, such as the precarious governments of El Salvador, Honduras or Guatemala, as well as apartheid Namibia or South Africa. In both Nicaragua and Mozambique the governments took over only abandoned land and factories, deserted after the Somocistas and Portuguese fled in panic during the final stages of the struggles. Anastasio Somoza Debayle himself owned over 25 per cent of the land, which was redistributed by the Sandinistas to collectives and to private small 2824 farmers. Mozambique set up state farms on abandoned estates, yet was so hesitant to nationalise functioning enterprises that the Sena Sugar Estates allowed cane to rot in the fields, the refinery to cease working and ran up a debt of $45m (equivalent to 15 per cent of the state budget) with the Bank of Mozambique before the government took over.6 Both governments did make it clear that the workers would now receive the fruits of their labour as workers organised in the factories and on communal plots to make management decisions. Debate and criticism of work conditions were encouraged. A major difference between Nicaragua and Mozambique is that Frelimo moved to nationalise the major sectors of the economy (banking, insurance, legal and health services, housing, and even pharmacies and funeral parlours), while the Sandinistas were explicitly restrained in nationalisation, with 66 per cent of agriculture and 75 per cent of industry remaining in private hands, although the state does control banking and trade.' Both Nicaragua and Mozambique have set up 'fair price' stores and cooperatives to assist in a more equitable distribution of basic necessities. The Sandinistas have repeatedly made it clear that they desire a mixed economy, to take advantage of the technology and expertise of the private sector. They are trying to avoid the mistake of over-nationalisation which Frelimo has now acknowledged. The impetus for this government intervention in the economy emerges from the necessity to transform the economic legacy of the toppled regime. Exploitation by the Somoza family was so extensive (owning land, banks, ports, shipping firms, airlines and newspapers) that even a blood bank, making a profit off peasants' donated blood, was owned by the family. The revolution was to change these economic structures, not simply replace the Somocistas with other exploiters. Frelimo came to power after ten years of war (1964-75). The fleeing Portuguese destroyed machinery, ripped out telephone wires, ruined tractors and trucks and generally sabotaged many of the factories. Independence did not mean the end of war, for Frelimo was already assisting the Zimbabwe National African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in its struggle against the Ian Smith regime of Rhodesia. The Rhodesians (with South African assistance), therefore, bombed Mozambican infrastructures - bridges, roads and irrigation systems. Mozambique also closed its border to Rhodesia, honouring the United Nations' call for sanctions. As in Nicaragua, government intervention in the economy was directed to rationalising production to serve the needs of the majority. A priority for both governments was to provide their citizens with services to improve the quality of life - and the successes were impressive, until destabilisation escalated. At independence in 1975 only 7 per cent of the Mozambican population had health services; by 1982 the number of health posts almost tripled, to provide some health services 2925 to 40 per cent. As in Nicaragua, there was a very successful inoculation campaign, covering almost the entire population of children. Only 7 per cent were literate after 400 years of Portuguese colonialism; ten years later, 30 per cent are literate.9 In Nicaragua tripling health facilities in rural areas helped reduce infant mortality from 121 per 1,000 in 1978 to 80 per 1,000 in 1983. Nurses and medical students in training have increased 600 and 1,000 per cent, respectively, since 1979.'° During the intensive campaign in 1980, called the 'second insurrection', literacy increased from 50 to 88 per cent, making it the third most literate Latin American country after Cuba and Argentina." The United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America reported that economic growth from 1979-83 increased by 7.67 per cent in real GDP per capita, while for Central America there was a decline of -14.71 per cent GDP per capita and for all of Latin America - 9.16 per cents Because both states intervened in their economies, often putting peasants and workers in charge of production, the US and South Africa labelled them 'communists' and Soviet puppets. The US government has conveniently ignored the fact that the Soviets were not crucial supporters in the Sandinista bid for power; further, the nationalist analysis of Augusto Cesar Sandino, the Nicaraguan hero who fought US imperialism in the 1930s, had more influence than any marxist-leninist doctrine.'3 Relations with the Soviets were not established until the end of 1979, months after the Sandinista victory. By 1983 Nicaragua's trade grew in both absolute and percentage terms with CMEA (Council on Mutual Economic Assistance), but only after the US cancellation of sugar quotas and the halt in Mexican oil deliveries. The USSR began supplying Nicaragua with oil, providing as much as 60 per cent in the first quarter of 1984." As the US blocked international loans and credits, the CMEA increased its share. 15 By 1987, however, the Soviets announced a decrease in both credit and oil shipments.'6 The Soviets (and the PRC, the World Council of Churches, the Scandinavians, etc.) did assist Frelimo in defeating Portuguese colonialism. There is a Treaty of Friendship (1977) between Mozambique and the Soviets, and Soviet technicians are helping in mining, fishing, medicine and transport. However, the Soviets were denied a base in Mozambique, for it is in the Mozambican constitution that no foreign power will be allowed a military base. Development assistance from the West and from the PRC is more important than from the Soviets." Finally, Mozambique has been openly critical of some Soviet policies, such as the invasion of Afghanistan. The Reagan Administration and South Africa, however, have reinterpreted the non-aligned policies of Mozambique and Nicaragua to claim that they are Soviet puppets. To warrant military, economic and political destabilisation, the regional conflict must take on an East-West rationale. Neither one is East-West, however, but really a North-South conflict. 3026 Economies in the South are becoming increasingly important to the US economy. For example, the US exports more to Mexico than to Britain," and markets among the burgeoning populations of the South are important to the revival of US capital. US imports of oil from the Caribbean have risen from 17 to 45 per cent of total oil imports since 1978, and rich deposits of several scarce strategic minerals have been discovered in Central America.'9 Cheap manufactures from developing countries have helped to keep inflation down in the industrialised countries. Finally, US hegemony demands that economies remain open to investment, maximising private production with 'free' competition and 'free' trade. South Africa, in turn, has had its sphere of influence narrowed as the Portuguese, who were willingly subservient to South African economic dominance, lost their colonies in Mozambique and Angola. And, when South Afric.a's preferred candidate for the new state of Zimbabwe - Bishop Muzorewa - was soundly defeated by Robert Mugabe, it turned instead to financing and reorganising the MNR, originally set up by the Ian Smith government of Rhodesia. In a vain attempt to sustain South African hegemony, MNR bases were moved from Rhodesia to South Africa to continue their forays into Mozambique. South Africa, as a developed economy located in the South, also relies on a secure source of cheap labour for production. Mozambicans migrating to the South African mines provided one-fourth to one-third of the labour in the gold mines until the 1970s.~' According to South African economists, increased industrial trade in the region is crucial to economic growth, for many of its exports are not competitive in the wider international market; estimated trade with the region is $2 billion. Further, it would like to remain the major outlet to the sea for six land- locked countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia, and for the rich Katanga province of Zaire). But Mozambique is developing three important ports (Maputo, Beira, Nacala), which could cut South African transport revenues in half. For both the US and South Africa it is unacceptable to have a truly non-aligned economy in their backyard. Nicaragua could set the pace in Central America and in the Caribbean for guaranteeing decent wages, promoting food crop before cash crop production and requiring international capital to reinvest, limit transfer pricing, etc. Although the economic factor is basic, it should not be overstated, however, for Central America represents only 1 per cent of US capital investment overseas. To the Reagan Administration, maintaining ideological hegemony is equally or even more important. Though not a threat to the national security of the US, Nicaragua is a serious threat to the ideological hegemony of the US in the hemisphere. Therefore, its lessons, its example must be 'neutralised'. '. And for South Africa, if the example of Mozambique is repeated by 3127 other neighbours, its economy, as presently constituted, could not continue. The obvious difference between the US and South Africa is that the apartheid economy is, in fact, disintegrating from the internal revolt of the people. In its last hour, the apartheid economy finds the dependence of Mozambique even more crucial and its ideological example intolerable. In addition to the vehement rhetoric of the East-West conflict and the reality of the North-South conflict, there is a third dimension: the 'West-West' conflict. In the recession in the 1980s the US has alleviated its own economic problems of stagflation and unemployment by exporting the crisis overseas. As Harvard economist David Calleo concluded, 'lack of resources to meet all domestic and foreign ambitions led to an exploitation of the international economic system ... Manipulating the system became the substitute for painful adjustment at home.'2' High interest rates in the US have attracted capital away from Europe to the US, making adjustments more difficult in Europe. Further, high US deficit spending meant that it did not follow the fiscal constraints required of smaller economies. At the advanced capitalist summits, discussions have generally reached an impasse as the US demands freer trade and its allies demand domestic US adjustments. In the economic crisis of the 1980s the West is not a monolithic block, but a multi-polarity of interests which can be played one against the other. Competition among the advanced capitalist countries for markets has also increased. Canada immediately took on the Nicaraguan trade office after Reagan's trade embargo closed it in Miami. Nicaragua has easily found alternative markets for its goods in both western and eastern Europe - in 1985 Great Britain and West Germany bought 11 per cent of Nicaragua's total exports Politically, the social democracies and parties in the Socialist International have also been important critics of destabilisation. The Scandinavian countries have aided Mozambique far more than the 'West' or the 'East'. Several European socialist parties and the Socialist International have established formal links with the Sandinistas. And the struggle is not simply between countries, but also within different countries. The Sandinistas have been quicker and more adept at realising this than Frelimo. They have invited a flow of norteamericanos, from farmers to workers to artists, to see Nicaragua for themselves. Such divisions both among and within the capitalist states have made the job of destabilisation more difficult. The 'enemy' may be the Sandinistas, but sabotage could kill US citizens who are picking coffee in the Nicaraguan mountains. (After the murder of American engineer Benjamin Linder in Nicaragua, the right-wing response was to try to restrict American travel to Nicaragua.) When the MNR kidnaps German, Italian, Portuguese, or American cooperantes (development workers), it is difficult for the right-wing in these countries to explain 3228 away these acts of terrorism. The Sandinistas have long said the American people are the only ones who can prevent the US government from invading Nicaragua. In a parallel sense, Frelimo fully understands that the best weapon against the MNR is revolution inside South Africa.z3 Destabilisation tactics Propaganda Destabilisation begins with the propaganda campaign, for it determines the success of the whole policy. Nationals of both the target and perpetrating countries must be convinced of the necessity to reverse policies of the new government. Systemic denigration of the Sandinistas and Frelimo is to convince Americans and South Africans that the governments are the 'enemy', and tagging a government 'communist' goes a long way to achieving that goal. The first offensive, therefore, is literally a war of words. For Nicaragua, President Reagan has escalated the word game by trying to attach a second label to the Sandinistas - terrorist. In July 1983 they were 'counterfeit revolutionaries', by mid-1984 a 'communist totalitarian state' and then a 'reign of terror' '14 In contrast, contras fighting the Nicaraguan government are 'the moral equivalent of our founding fathers', and by June 1985, 'Their goals are our goals'.25 Frelimo has not yet been accused of terrorism, but rather of supporting the 'terrorists' of the ANC - guilt by association. The language must relate, however tenuously, to events, so disinformation campaigns are conducted. Examples for Nicaragua are many. The November 1984 Reagan accusation that MIGs were in ships on their way to Managua was sustained for days although it proved totally false. President Daniel Ortega requested a US visa to speak in several cities after he had addressed the fortieth anniversary of the UN in October 1985. The visa was denied so he cancelled the engagements. The day he was to leave for the UN, a visa was granted. When he did not proceed with his cancelled engagements, the press was told that he was afraid to confront the American peoples. 26 For Mozambique the propaganda accusations are equally serious. After bombing a jam factory and a child-care centre outside Maputo, South Africa insisted that an ANC strong-hold had been eliminated. When it did attack ANC offices in Maputo, it insisted that they were a military base. Propaganda directed inside the target country is well organised and financed. Probably the most successful campaign, because it takes advantage of the mistakes the Sandinistas made, is the accusation that they are repressing the Miskito Indians. While refugees in the US from 3329 El Salvador and Guatemala are sent back to their countries, some to be executed, the Miskitos who went into Honduras are treated by the US government and media as heroic refugees from 'totalitarianism'. The Sandinistas admit they had been insensitive to cultural differences on the Atlantic Coast and had alienated the black and indigenous people of Zelaya by moving them from the rivers to protected villages. More than one faction (Misura/Kisan, Misurasata) of the Nicaraguan Resistance are formed by those alienated from the Sandinistas. However, as community groups discussed drafts of the new Nicaraguan constitution, autonomy laws for the Atlantic Coast were added to protect minority rights and cultures. From 1984 Atlantic Coast peoples have been returning to their homes and now defend their villages against the contrast MNR propaganda is not as sophisticated as that directed by the CIA for the contras, probably because they do not have the same amount of resources available to them. Further, Mozambique is a vast and empty country, compared to Nicaragua. Terror against isolated villages is much easier in Mozambique, even with trained people's militias to protect them. The MNR has, therefore, penetrated every province of Mozambique, controlling populations mainly through terror.28 They were also able to take advantage of the natural disaster of three years of drought, blaming Frelimo for the lack of food and supplies to the villages. The propaganda campaigns in the 1980s have reached new levels of international coordination and of sophistication. Right-wing groups organised to 'roll-back communism' have existed since the 1950s, but they have gained importance with the resurgence of conservative governments in the late 1980s. All of them disseminate their views through the media, but some have become right-wing 'think tanks', providing analysis directly to governments. The Council for Inter-American Studies (CIS) wrote the Santa Fe Report which was the blueprint for Reagan's Central American policy in his first term; four CIS members joined the Administration to carry out the plan.29 The Committee on the Present Danger boasts of fifty members in government service. In Europe, the Hans Siedel Foundation of the Conservative CSU in Bavaria holds strategy sessions on Southern Africa, attended by South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha and UNITA of Angola.3° The Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the ruling CDU party in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has helped formulate the constitution for the Multi-Party Conference (MPC), the South African puppet government in Namibia, and has contributed funds to the MPC." The Internationale de la Resistance (Paris) has members who have been in the European Parliament, and those attending its first press conference included Simone Veil, an adamant anti-fascist. The Internationale interprets the actions of the MNR and the Nicaraguan Resistance (as well as 3430 counter-revolutionaries in Angola, Afghanistan and Kampuchea) to European parliamentarians as 'resistance to totalitarianism'. On 21 March 1985 its advertisement in Le Monde calling for the US Congress to finance the contras was signed by several prominent politicians, including Malcolm Fraser of Australia (who became co-chair of the 'eminent persons' group to discuss sanctions by the Commonwealth against South Africa).32 These groups, and there are many others, interpret the role of the counter-revolutionaries and give them access to American and European policy-makers. Tactics of other right-wing organisations are even more comprehensive. Such groups as Reverend Moon's Unification Church, the World Anti-Communist Leagues (WACL), the European Institute for Security Matters and Citizens for America provide everything from media campaigns and conferences to material aid and contacts with corporate ex- ecutives for the counter-revolutionaries. For example, the WACL, led by retired Major General John K. Singlaub, held a conference in San Diego, California, in September 1984 where the MNR arrived with a shopping list: 500 surface-to-air missiles, small arms for 15,000 troops, AK-47 ammo, bazookas and demolition equipment (as well as 'access to the media and important legislators').33 Documentation on Reverend Moon's organisation is extensive, and it is fully involved in Central American destabilisation, providing free trips and money for anti- government Nicaraguans such as Steadman Fagoth (Misura) and Edgar Chamorro.j4 Another set of organisations is more specialised and only acts as a conduit for money to the counter-revolutionaries from corporations and from the groups mentioned above. The list for Central America is long, including groups that claim only 'humanitarian' aid: Friends of the Americas, Human Development Fund, Americares, Knights of Malta, Refugee Relief International, World Medical Relief (this latter has worked hand-in-glove with the CIA for many years, supplying Hmong mercenaries in Laos and other anti-communist forces).j5 The mercenary business is alive and well as Soldier of Fortune magazine, known for its recruitment for Angola and Rhodesia, continues to recruit and training camps are operating in Florida, Alabama and California.36 Their funds are from private corporations and such training is strictly against US law, but no Department of Justice or congressional investigations have been initiated. On the contrary, 'material aid' from the private groups hitchhikes down to Central America out of US airbases.37 Mozambique has been able to document how Portuguese businessmen help to finance the MNR. MIRN, composed of Portuguese who lost property in Mozambique as they fled Frelimo's rule, has directly aided the MNR. Mercenaries, who receive $1,750 per month, are trained in Portugal before flying to South Africa.18 Frelimo also has evidence 3531 of material aid directed through Oman and the Comoros to the MNR. The organisations which assist counter-revolutionaries with lobbying parliamentarians, media campaigns and analysis from think tanks provide an international network for the counter-revolutionaries which gives them a legitimacy far beyond their own capabilities. By attending international conferences, speaking to government officials, appearing on television, they gain credibility; in fact, because neither the FDN nor the MNR has legitimacy with the local people, the international 'respectability' is crucial to their success. The reasons for the proliferation of organisations like the above, however, go beyond legal lobbying or international networking. With funds for counter-revolutionaries threatened in the elected parliaments, the organisations represent the 'privatisation of roll-back'. When Congress cuts off funds to the contras, it is not a problem for their continuing operations because the private organisations are willing conduits. Similarly, the South African government can say funding for the MNR continues because of private Portuguese interests not under South African control. A second important reason for the organisations is that, as 'private' entities, they are not subject to as much public scrutiny as government administrations. In the US the private organisations are used explicitly to avoid the Freedom of Information Act. To cite one example, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), formed in November 1983, was inspired by President Reagan's speech in 1982 to the British parliament calling for new mechanisms to combat 'communism' in developing countries. It is a private, non-profit organisation to 'build democratic institutions abroad' and received $18 million per year in 1984 and 1985 from USIA. Reagan's foreign policy is represented on the Board, with the chair, Carl Gershman, a former aide to Jeane Kirkpatrick. On the Board are Secretary of Labor William Brock, chair of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Dante Fascell and National Republican Committee Chair Frank Fahrenkopf.;~ Yet because NED is 'private', it conducts closed meetings and no minutes are published. It is exempt from the restriction on engaging in the internal affairs of other countries and does not have to disclose documents under the Freedom of Information Act. It carries out the foreign policy of the Right, therefore, without oversight or accountability. Economic destabilisation An early phase of destabilisation is economic de-linking, purposefully disrupting long-term relations to hurt the weaker partner. Mozambique sought to maintain economic relations with South Africa even in the midst of the Rhodesian war. Acknowledging one hundred years of economic subordination to South Africa, Frelimo's analysis was that it 3632 could afford to close the border with Rhodesia but never with South Africa. The major source of revenue for Portuguese Mozambique - set up as a service economy to South Africa - was port and rail fees for goods coming from the Transvaal. Further, remittances to Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa were paid to the colonial government in gold, which then paid the miners in escudos; Portugal thus earned valuable foreign exchange. It was South Africa, not Frelimo, that reduced rail traffic through Maputo by 80 per cent from 1975 to 1983 and curtailed the number of Mozambique workers from 118,030 in 1975 to 41,362 in 1977. 40 From 1977-1979 the US Congress voted against any aid to Mozambique because of its violation of 'human rights'; only food aid was sent after devastating floods. In 1984 over 100,000 Mozambicans starved to death.4' It was a silent death, for the international community was not aware that. several areas of Mozambique suffered hunger as much as in Ethiopia. Without the MNR attacking food caravans and Red Cross trucks as explicit targets, the drought would not have caused the deaths.42 Yet there was no international outcry against South Africa. The German Red Cross pulled out of Mozambique because of MNR attacks on its operations, without denouncing the terrorism. During the 1982-4 drought, the US delayed food aid to Mozambique. Only after Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord (non-aggression pact) did US aid flow into the country. In 1984 the US became the largest emergency food supplier; since then aid has diminished from $30m for 1986 to a requested $11.6m for 1988. Choosing a Janus strategy, the US government puts little economic pressure on South Africa to stop financing the MNR and yet provides aid to Mozambique. The US suspended all loans to Nicaragua, complaining that its debt was too high and its payments were in arrears (although the government and banks seem to have supplied Somoza with all he needed). When Nicaragua approached the Inter-American Development Bank for $60m, Secretary of State Schultz threatened no new financing from the US for the IADB if the directors granted the loan. It was successfully blocked.43 In October 1982 Standard Fruit, the only banana export company in Nicaragua, terminated a five-year contract it signed only a year before. Exxon refused to transport Mexican oil to Nicaragua. By April 1985 Reagan gave an executive order to impose a trade embargo unilaterally, breaking three treaties with Nicaragua (GATT, OAS, Treaty of Friendship). In 1983 after the US had reduced Nicaragua's sugar quota, the Sandinistas found alternatives in Mexico, Algeria and the USSR; after the embargo, European countries welcomed Nicaraguan products. The major concern was oil, for Mexico, which had been providing it at below market rate, could do so no longer. When President Daniel Ortega went to Moscow in 1985 to negotiate a credit of $400m for oil 3733 and farm inputs, after the US had cut off capital and trade, the American government accused the Sandinistas of being a Soviet puppet. Military destabilisation Economic de-linking is part of a two-pronged tactic, the other part of which is direct economic sabotage. Both the MNR and the contras have attacked economic infrastructures, technical personnel and productive sectors. If the economy is not permitted to function, then any transformation of economic structures or transition to socialism cannot take place. One frequently hears from analysts who are sympathetic to Mozambique that Frelimo has failed to transform the economic relations of production. Frelimo fully admits its mistakes - for example, overreliance on the state farms to produce foods for the cities - but the criticism should acknowledge that Frelimo has not had a chance to implement its policies. A few examples are sufficient to outline the extensive damage done by destabilisation policies. In Mozambique sabotage on the infrastructure ranges from oil storage tanks in the port of Beira to the electricity pylons from the Cabora Bassa dam - from 1982 to 1986, more than $50m of electrical power lines and substations were destroyed.44 This sabotage is especially remarkable because most of the electricity is for South Africa. Built by South African and Portuguese financing, Cabora Bassa was to serve the growing industrial sector of the Transvaal - Mozambique, to date, uses about 5 per cent of the power in Tete province. Because of extensive coal deposits, South Africa subsequently decided it could do without Cabora Bassa; a spokesman from the South African energy authority Escom said the power 'would have been nice to have, because hydroelectric power is cheaper than that from coal, but the loss is not a crisis. I won't say that Cabora Bassa has been written off, but there is not certainty of getting power from it again. '45 Therefore, the MNR sabotaged what could have been a foreign exchange earner for Mozambique and, at the same time, appeared to be acting independently of South Africa by attacking one of its electricity sources. As stated earlier, Mozambique has three ports which serve six land- locked countries. From 1982 to 1986, $82m worth of rails and bridges have been destroyed.46 Since 1982 Zimbabwe troops have been helping to keep the Beira line open. The rail to Maputo was built for the Transvaal, but is also important to Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe. By regularly attacking bridges, the MNR again appears to be attacking South African interests, but the sabotage is more important to force the other three states to use South African ports and to jeopardise crucial foreign exchange earnings for Mozambique. The CIA tried to sabotage Nicaragua's port by mining it, but this act of war outraged the US Congress and it had the mines removed. Oil 3834 storage tanks have also been bombed. The contras operating from Costa Rica have tried to isolate Atlantic coast villages by attacking river traffic, the main highway of the region. Further, they target the road from Managua to Rama, trying to cut Nicaragua in half. Factories and fields have also been under direct fire. Each year since 1982 Nicaragua has been uncertain whether it will be allowed to collect its vital coffee harvest because of contra attacks. Thousands of people are mobilised not only to pick coffee but to protect the pickers. In 1984 20,000 youth ready to go to the fields had to remain in Managua as militia because of threats of an American invasion. Coffee-processing plants and grain storage facilities have also been bombed. In Mozambique the list of assaults range from mines in the north (where foreign technicians as well as Mozambicans were killed) to metal works, milling factories, a match factory and an ammo dump in Maputo. Angonia, in the north-east province of Tete, used to be the breadbasket for all of Mozambique; in 1985 thousands fled the region into Zambia and Zimbabwe, not because of the drought (which was over), but because of the MNR. Tete city, the closest urban area to Angonia, had to receive air- lifts of food from the south to avoid mass starvation. 41 In June 1986 the Sena Sugar Estates' crops and refineries were levelled, and 20,000 head of breed cattle slaughtered. Given the legacies of underdevelopment and war ('popular uprising' in Nicaragua) for both countries, the cost of destabilisation is very high. Nicaragua reports 250,000 persons displaced from their homes, or 8.3 per cent of the population; Mozambique has 4.5m persons displaced, or 33.1 per cent of its population.48 A UNICEF report states that Mozambique (along with Angola) has the highest death rate among children under 5 years old in the world, and the report gives the cause: war waged by South Africa .49Because of dislocation of the people and systematic burning of crops by the MNR, domestic production of grain for 1987 has only provided 8 per cent of market and emergency needs. The remaining 92 per cent 'will have to come from external sources Destabilisation has clearly retarded development and increased dependence on outside aid. Military destabilisation reflects an old tactic of the US, one very familiar to Nicaragua, but which did not work for Vietnam. The US used the first Somoza to assassinate Sandino after his forces proved too much for the US Marines. As a Nicaraguan, Somoza was much more efficient in carrying out US policy than any occupation force. This time the US has not been able to impose its selected leaders on the Nicaraguan people. The US policy choice is, therefore, to use neighbouring countries, along with disaffected Nicaraguans in the army. When she was US ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick told Costa Rica, which had had no military for decades, to build one or US aid would be cut off.51 Honduran military and bases on Honduran soil 3935 support the contras. However, command strategy and tactics are in the hands of US commanders who train both Hondurans and the contras. US personnel laid mines in the main harbour of Nicaragua; US pilots fly helicopters and supply planes, as the downing of Eugene Hasenfus' plane demonstrated. US military personnel in a new Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) flew saboteurs inside Nicaragua in 1983 and 1984 and returned fire to cover their retreat. Although some ISA activities were reported to Congress, these activities, engaging regular US troops inside Nicaragua, were not. 52 The US has built or enlarged eight airfields in Central America since 1983. To move men and equipment in a hurry, the US government tripled the budget of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) in three years, to $600m in 1986.53 SOF led the invasion of Grenada and heads military training teams. The Pentagon is not required to report its activities to Congress, and its motto summarises the intentions: 'Anything, any time, anywhere, anyhow.' As the US is to the contras, so South Africa is to the MNR. It trains MNR forces in South Africa at camps in Phalaborwa and Louis Trichardt, with another possible one near Nelspruit. Captured documents, MNR diaries, telex messages and transcribed radio messages confirm that South African army commanders are directing operations One document quotes General van der Westhuizen, head of military intelligence, as affirming the commitment of the South African security apparatus to the MNR. In addition, Deputy Foreign Minister Louis Nel three times flew for consultations to Gorongosa camp deep inside Mozambique in Sofala province. 55 South Africa has also been using one of its client states to promote the MNR in the north of Mozambique. Malawi, which has full diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime and has received much development assistance from it, has provided bases and supplies for the MNR. When President Samora Machel visited Malawi in October 1984 and August 1986, President Banda admitted that many of his senior police and military officers were ex-Mozambicans who fled Frelimo because of their role in the colonial war. The implication was that these officers assisted the MNR, with acquiescence from Banda. The leaders of Zimbabwe and Zambia joined Machel in threatening Banda that all transport links through their countries would be closed if he did not remove aid to the MNR. Soon afterwards (19 October 1986) Machel's plane crashed in South African territory, killing him and several Frelimo leaders. Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique all accuse South Africa of sabotaging the plane, at least in part as reprisal for the pressure that was put on Malawi. Use of neighbouring bases, however, is one of the differences between South Africa and the US. Machel's death did not increase Malawi's resolve; instead, by early 1987, Malawian troops were helping to guard 4036 the Nacala railroad in Mozambique from MNR sabotage to allow refurbishing to proceed. Supply flights from Malawi over northern Mozambique reduced. MNR activity picked up further south in Mozambique, where it could be supplied directly from South Africa. In short, Malawi seems to have reduced its support of MNR operations. The other neighbours (in contrast to the situation in Central America) have stood firmly behind Mozambique from the beginning. Zimbabwe has supplied troops to protect the Beira railway since 1982. By mid-1985 Zim- babwean troops were in joint operations with Frelimo, with Zimbab- wean helicopters and paratroopers a deciding factor in some operations. By 1987 estimates of the cost to Zimbabwe were as high as $lm per day. Tanzania also sent troops for joint operations in northern Mozambique, and both Zimbabwe and Tanzania have been training Mozambican forces. Because the contras and bandidos cannot rely on the people, their tactics are dependent on a very high level of technology and skill in supply. Nicaragua complained in the UN Security Council in December 1985 that the contras used a surface-to-air missile to down a Nicaraguan helicopter over Nicaraguan territory. 'Pirana' speed boats attack the Nicaraguan Coast Guard in Nicaraguan waters. An American commander affirmed that the contras have 'the best technology we've got', complete with electronic eavesdropping equipment on Tiger Island off the Gulf of Fonseca .56 The destruction of electricity pylons in Mozambique requires a high level of technical knowledge of explosives. South Africa also uses submarines to pick up MNR leaders and escaping saboteurs from Mozambique's long (1,000 kilometers) and unguarded coast. Mobility and supply for the counter-revolutionaries are provided by fancy helicopters, submarines and speed boats, not by the people organized to assist the insurgents. Militarisation and privatisation of foreign policy Destabilisation of a neighbouring country has been part of the militarisation of foreign policy for both the US and South Africa. Negotiations, diplomacy - which mean compromise - have played a minor role in South African and American foreign policy since the escalation of destabilisation in 1981. Choosing the military option, however, is not simply considered the most effective means for the stated policy objectives; it also serves the domestic goal of strengthening the executive in both countries. Secret military operations cannot be fully scrutinised by the legislature, which has the purpose of debating policy openly. After the expos6s of the Gulf of Tonkin incident (1964) and the bombing of Cambodia (1969) without US congressional consent, the Congress tried to reassert its role in foreign policy. The War Powers Act of 4137 1973 allows the President to introduce armed forces overseas only when US forces are under attack, and then only for sixty days unless Congress declares war. In 1974 the Congress also limited cash sales of arms overseas, and from 1975 onwards it required the CIA to report covert operations to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.57 Finally, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act requiring the US government to release files of citizens who had been under surveillance. Many viewed these laws as a return to the balance and separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. However, the conservatives saw them as an attack on the ability of the American government to act expeditiously against its enemies, citing the 'loss' of Iran, Nicaragua and Angola from the American sphere of influence. The Reagan Administration had as its major goal the restoration of presidential authority in order to reassert American interests; Congress, with all its committees and factions, was a cumbersome hindrance to incisive assertion of power. The American president must 'stand tall', not only over the rest of the world, but over the law-makers. Reagan was successful with this agenda into the second term. The general climate of anti-communism, promoted through the various foundations discussed above, set the theme for the president. With his personal popularity, he was able to act unilaterally and deflect polite congressional questions. After Nicaragua twice took the US government to the World Court, once over the mining of the harbour and once over the embargo, Reagan removed the US, which had been a founding member, from the court. When questioned about the constitutionality of such a unilateral executive action, he claimed that the constitution required US Senate approval for international treaties, but it said nothing about Senate approval to abrogate them. Resurgence of the CIA was signalled when Reagan appointed William Casey, one of its founders, as director in 1981. From 1973 to 1981, when the CIA came under closer congressional scrutiny, the Central Intelligence Analysis (information-gathering) wing gained prominence over the covert operations wing, but Casey moved immediately to restore the covert actions to its previous prominence. He won restrictions on the Freedom of Information disclosures for the CIA, as well as harsh legal reprisals for anyone who disclosed CIA activities. 58 As is now well documented, the expanded role of the CIA was not sufficient for some in the executive branch. The National Security Advisor ran extensive covert operations in support of the contras. During the congressional hearings of May-August 1987 the operations were frequently referred to as 'secret government within our government' (Senator Daniel Inouye), for many foreign policy decisions were made, from financing and supplying the contras to trading arms for hostages in the Middle East. 4238 Because the secret operations were mainly for military purposes, several military officers were key to the policy (Colonel MacFarland, Admiral Poindexter, Lieutenant-Colonel North, Major-Generals Secord and Singlaub). They also boasted of their 'can-do' skills, the ability to execute plans expeditiously. Through their military connections, they acquired ships, weapons, missiles and requisitioned military flights for the covert operations. CIA and National Security Advisor operations are closely intertwined with private firms. Links for recruitment of mercenaries go directly to the CIA, as they did for the war in Rhodesia and still do for Angola. The CIA contributes large sums of money to the contras, which are channelled through private organisations and corporations. Yet it is against the Neutrality Act for any private group to support or participate in military action against any country at peace with the US without a formal declaration of war by Congress. There are also strict restrictions on activities of non-profit organisations which must remain 'educational' and refrain from supporting a particular political line; many of the right-wing groups claim this non-profit (tax-exempt) status. In working closely with several of these groups, the CIA ignores these laws. The congressional hearings have left many of these private, secret links in place. Even if the operations out of the National Security Ad- visor's office have been curtailed, little has yet been done to delimit the private business operations in funding the contras. President Reagan continues to deny that he knew profits from arms sales to Iran were used to fund the contras. As the congressional hearings proceeded, however, he admitted knowing about extensive extra-legal operations, not under the scrutiny of his own National Security Council or the Congress, which determined foreign policy. Secret operations greatly strengthen the hand of the executive against the Congress and the American public, who are kept misinformed about activities and relationships. The arms deals are not secret to the adversary (Iran), for they are involved. The wars are not secret to the people bombed. It is the American public and many of their elected representatives who become redundant in the privatisation of foreign policy. Many questions not answered in the congressional hearings concern the role of drug-running by or for the contras to finance their operations. Court cases are pending to determine whether and how much drugs from Latin America supported the contras. More than one assassination attempt is also possibly linked to the 'back pocket' operations, such as the attempted assassination of Eden Pastora, an ex-contra leader who would not be bought off by the CIA to join the other leaders. (Pastora escaped, but three reporters and five of his men were killed, with twenty-six others injured.)59 The South African government is very different from the US, but there are three important similarities: (1) the executive has been 4339 strengthened relative to the legislature; (2) the role of covert actions and of the military has increased in policy formulations; (3) liaison of private business and organisations with the executive facilitates avoidance of public debate about foreign policy. In South Africa, these roles are primarily to maintain white supremacy. However, in the 'Total Strategy' policy since 1977, that goal is not simply domestic policy. The 'total onslaught', as the government calls the people's bid for one person-one vote, is perceived as coming from without, as from within, South Africa. 'National security' for the whites is the main foreign policy goal. The 1984 constitutional change was widely publicised because it established three racial houses of parliament: White, Coloured, Asian; the majority Africans remain totally disenfranchised and unrepresented. An element of the new constitution which did not receive much press attention was the increased powers of the executive, now called the president, not the prime minister. If one or more houses rejects a bill from committee, it is referred to the President's Council for arbitration. Dominated by whites, Council decisions cannot be vetoed by parliament. The President's Council can, therefore, impose its will even though its majority party (white) has a minority of total MPs in parliament. With the parliament reduced to a debating society, final decisions are with the President's Council. Another executive body, the State Security Council (SSC), is a committee of the cabinet, but has much more power than other cabinet committees. It advises the formulation and implementation 'of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic* an assignment broad enough to cover almost any policy. In contrast to other cabinet committees, decisions do not have to be circulated as appendices to cabinet minutes and meetings are not open to cabinet ministers not formally appointed to the SSC. The president is chair with ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Police as well as heads of the National Intelligence Service, the police and the defence forces as members. The increased role of the SSC in foreign policy has downgraded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and considerably increased the role of the military. As Philip H. Frankel, of the University of Witwatersrand, shows: militarymen are in general placed at strategic points to influence virtually every aspect of public policy. This influence has progressively increased since 1980 as Botha and his military allies have moved to an ever more embracing conception of 'national security' which penetrates into virtually every aspect of political, economic, and cultural life and as the powers of the legislature have been eroded to the advantage of the office of prime minister and the state security network.6' 4440 It is this unique and powerful body (operating mainly in secret) which causes analysts to refer to changes in the South African government as a 'creeping coup d'etat'. For example, the SSC is solely responsible for the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) which handles almost all intelligence work. In addition, as discussed earlier, the DMI commands the MNR in Mozambique. The ex-head of DMI, Lieutenant-General I P.W. van der Westhuizen, now serves as a secretary to the SSC. Heading a staff of eighty-seven to serve the SSC, his role is not too different from the National Security Advisor to the US National Security Council. In contrast to the US, however, under the SSC the penetration of the South African military into all levels of administration has been very systematic. Twelve 'Joint Military Commands' (JMCs) operate at the level of the old provincial councils; these are subdivided into sixty 'sub- JMCs' at the level of metropolitan regions. Mini-JMCs (448 of them) work at the level of local authorities or town councils. The purpose of this network is to contain political resistance, coordinate a broad 'hearts and minds' strategy by improving social conditions in black areas and act as an early warning system to the SSC for potential problems.6z The most important link between private business and the military is Armscor (Armaments Corporation of South Africa), which is the sole procurement agent of arms for the defence forces. Except for a few wholly-owned subsidiaries, Armscor relies on close cooperation with private corporations for research, development and manufacturing of armaments. The ten-man Board is appointed by the president and is responsible to the minister of defence, yet has only two government representatives. The chair and most of the directors are from the private sector, but their names are not revealed for fear of jeopardising their foreign business interests. In fact, most of what Armscor does is highly secret, for it is against the law to disclose 'any information in relation to the acquisition, supply, marketing, importation, export, development, manufacture, maintenance or repair of, or research in connection with armaments by, for, on behalf of, or for the benefit of the Armaments Corporation or a subsidiary company Armscor, therefore, is a state corporation run almost exclusively by private enterprise and subcontracting thousands of contracts to large and small private corporations. While internal revolt and strikes reduce the profit of most businesses, the most profitable corporations are those linked with the highly sub- sidised armaments production - at least for the short term. The South African government has institutionalised the executive- military dominance over parliament, a major structural difference from the separation of powers between the US Congress and the executive. The Congress could reassert its control of the purse over foreign policy and its oversight of covert operations once again. The use of private business and foundations to promote covert operations is not new in 4541 US history, but Congress could tighten those controls also; most of the laws needed are already on the books. The South African parliament, in contrast, has been reduced to an impotent rubber-stamp of the executive will. As even white opposition grew in parliament, decision- making was taken over by the State Security Council, which can be controlled by one party, even a minority party. The constitutional change gave the appearance of bringing non-whites into the system while neutralising the parliament they sat in. US-South African collaboration In spite of verbal condemnation of apartheid, the Reagan Administration has increased support for it because of similar ideologies of anti- communism, supported by a heavy dose of racism. The list is long and has been fully documented: increased exchange of military personnel and nuclear scientists; increased sales of 'para-military' equipment; increased trade; increased bank loans; full diplomatic support, expecially over the stalling of negotiations on Namibia; diplomatic and material support of Jonas Savimbi of UNITA in Angola.64 In October 1986 the US Congress passed a mild South African sanctions bill over the veto of President Reagan. One of his own presidential committees concluded that 'constructive engagement' had failed and conditions were worse, not better, under apartheid.65 Yet support for the apartheid regime continues. Information has begun to emerge which would help to explain the perpetuation of a policy which has not begun to meet its stated goals. It seems that South Africa has not only paralleled the American destabilisation policy, but has directly assisted the Reagan Administration in Central America. CIA chief William Casey and CIA Latin American division chief Duane Clarridge both travelled to South Africa to solicit aid for the contras. In a 'vest pocket' operation run outside normal channels, some sources say a South African cargo corporation, SAFAIR, provided planes to Southern Air Transport which regularly flew weapons to the contras. Lieutenant-Colonel North met Southern Air Transport pilots and said that 'third country' (South Africa) pilots would fly weapons into Nicaragua from El Salvador According to an intelligence report dated February 1985, the CIA learned that Eden Pastora had actually received 200,000 tons of weapons from South Africa. However, the CIA said it had no role in the shipmen t. 67 In testimony to congressional committees in August 1987 Clarridge denied that any transactions resulted from the trips to South Africa. The talks were, however, apparently part of complicated negotiations in which the CIA would share intelligence with South Africa to be passed on to UNITA in Angola.68 At the time, American 4642 law barred the Administration from assisting UNITA, but there was nothing to prevent South Africa from passing on sensitive information on its own. Several investigations are pursuing both the possible violation of the intent of the Clark Amendment (barring aid to UNITA) and the links between the apartheid regime and aid to the contras. If even partially correct, these covert relations would help explain why President Reagan would not want to sanction an ally which was helping him with important foreign policy goals. References 1 Bjorn Hettne, 'Structural dependence and destabilisation in Central America and the Caribbean', Development and Peace (No. 6, 1985), p. 80. 2 Fred Halliday, The making of the second cold war (London, 1983), p. 246. 3 A June 1985 New York Times/CBS poll cited 53 per cent against funding the con tras. An August 1987 Washington Post/ABC poll found 59 per cent against funding the contras, even after weeks of pro-contra testimony in the congressional hearings on the Iran-contra affair. 4 Joanne Omang, 'A historical background to the CIA's Nicaragua Manual' in the CIA's Nicaragua Manual, Psychological operations in guerrilla warfare (New York, 1985), p. 18. 5 Ibid., p. 19. 6 Barry Munslow, Mozambique: the revolution and its origins (London, 1983), p. 163. 7 Renee Lowensen, speech on Nicaragua, Harare, Zimbabwe, 6 March 1985. 8 AIM (Agencia de Informaçao de Moçambique) Information Bulletin (No. 112, 1985), p. 2. 9 AIM, Information Bulletin (No. 106, 1985), p.11. 10 David Sanders, speech on health care in Nicaragua, Harare, Zimbabwe, (5 March 1985). UNICEF, The state of the world's children 1986 (London, 1985), p. 38. 11 Sheryl Hirshon, A nd also teach them to read (Westport, CT, 1983), p. xi. 12 UN Economic Commission for Latin America, 'Preliminary overview of the Latin American economy during 1983', E/CEPAL/G 1279 (29 December 1983), cited in Martin E. Conroy, 'Economic legacies and policies: performance and critique', in Thomas W. Walker (ed.), Nicaragua: the first five years (New York, 1985), p. 224. 13 In Che Guevara's Guerra de guerrillas, he discusses Augusto Cesar Sandino's strug gle against the US Marines as an antecedent for the Cuban revolutionary movement of the 1950s. Perhaps it was not the Cubans who influenced the Nicaraguans, but the other way around. 'Nicaragua and the socialist countries', NACLA (Vol. 19, no. 3, 1985), p. 33. 14 The Washington Post (16 August 1984). 15 'The other superpower: the Soviet Union and Latin America 1917-1987', NACLA (Vol. 21, no. I, 1987), pp. 10 and 27; and Los Angeles Times (27 June 1987); see also Augusto Varas (ed.), Soviet-Latin American relations in the 1980s . 16 New York Times (20 August 1987). 17 Carol B. Thompson, Challenge to imperialism: the frontline states in the liberation of Zimbabwe (Boulder, 1986), pp. 126-30. 18 Andreas Balogh, 'New features in the Third World policy of the US', Development and Peace (No. 6, 1985), p. 55. Lawrence S. Eagleburger before the House Foreign Relations Committee in July 1981 cited the developing countries 'as the most impor tant areas of the shift in the balance of East-West relations', p. 54. 4743 19 The Nation (16 June 1984), p. 729. 20 Barry Munslow, op. cit., p. 18. 21 David P. Calleo, The imperious economy (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 172-3. 22 Central America Report (Vol. 14, no. 22, 12 June 1987), p. 171. 23 Personal interviews of Frelimo leaders, Maputo, 28 May-4 June 1986. 24 Roy Gutman, 'Nicaragua: America's diplomatic charade', Foreign Policy (No. 56, 1984), p. 16. 25 Central American Bulletin (April 1985), p. 7. Newsweek (17 June 1985), p. 36. 26 Guardian (New York, 6 November 1985), p. 5. 27 Central America Report (Vol. 14, no. 12, 27 March 1987), p. 93; see also Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, 'Indigenous rights and regional autonomy in revolutionary Nicaragua', Latin American Perspectives (Vol. 14, no. 1, 1987), pp. 43-66. 28 Several interviews from eye-witnesses working with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Mozambique; interviews in Harare, Zimbabwe, June-December 1985. 29 Jerry Sanders, 'Terminators', Mother Jones (August-September 1983), pp. 36-41. 30 Africa Confidential (28 November 1984). 31 Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, press statement: 'Conspiracy between FRG and Racist South Africa', (Luanda, 23 May 1985). 32 Internationale de la Résistance, Declaration of Principles and List of Support Com mittee Members, mimeo (4 June 1983); Afrique-Asie (14 January 1985). 33 Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 40. 34 Manchester Guardian Weekly (23 February 1985 and 3 March 1985), both p. 13; Fred Clarkson, 'Privatising the war', Covert Action (No. 22, 1984), pp. 31-3. 35 Guardian (New York, 12 March 1985), p. 3. 36 Ward Churchill, 'Soldier of Fortune's Robert K. Brown', Covert Action, op. cit., p. 13. 37 Fred Clarkson, op. cit., p. 33; also documented in Iran-contra hearings, May-August 1987. 38 Agence France Presse Wireservice (2 January 1985). 39 Fay Hansen, 'The AFL and CIO and the endowment for democracy', Economic Notes (May-June 1985), pp. 12-15. 40 People's Republic of Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 30 and 32. 41 Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Disasters, People's Republic of Mozambique, Natural disasters hamper development (10 March 1985), p. 22. 42 Eye-witnesses report that the MNR continuously target trucks that carry the Red Cross emblem; food trucks, even with military convoys, have also been targeted. 43 Sunday Mail (Harare, 5 December 1985). 44 Allen Isaacman, 'An African war ensnarls the ultra-right', Los Angeles Times (28 June 1987). 45 Financial Gazette (Harare, 20 December 1985). 46 Allen Isaacman, op. cit. 47 See regular reports in AIM Information Bulletins. Confirmed by interviews of representatives of NGOs in Harare, Zimbabwe, October-December 1985. 48 Carlos Fernando Chamorro, 'Disinformation: the other face of the war', Barricada (Vol. 7, no. 248, 16 July 1987), p. 6. AIM, Information Bulletin (no. 133, 1987), p. 9. 49 Reginold H. Green et al, 'Children in Southern Africa', Children on the front line (New York, March 1987). 50 AIM (August 1987), op. cit., p. 10. 51 Bjorn Hettne, op. cit., p. 100. 52 St Louis Post Dispatch (26 July 1987). 53 South (October 1985), p. 40. 54 Quoted documents from Gorongosa Camp, 'Angola and Mozambique under at tack', Resister, Journal of the Committee on South African War Resistance (No. 41, December 1985-January 1986), pp. 9-10. AIM, Information Bulletin (No. 111, 1985), pp. 3-7. 4844 55 Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), Destructive Engagement (Harare, 1986), pp. 36-7. 56 New York Times (4 June 1985). 57 James L. Sundquist, The decline and resurgency of Congress (Washington D.C., 1981 ), pp. 330-332; Cecil V. Crabb, Jr and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to struggle: Con gress, the president and foreign policy (Washington, D.C., 1985), pp. 137-46. 58 Roger Morris, 'Casey's past told us "Fixer" would get us into a fix', Los Angeles Times (28 August 1987). 59 Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan, 'The Carlos file', The Nation (5 October 1985), pp. 311-315; Affidavit of Daniel Sheehan, filed in Federal Court, 12 December 1986 (Washington, DC, 1987). 60 Deon Geldenhuys, The diplomacy of isolation: South African foreign policy mak ing (Johannesburg, 1984), p. 92. 61 Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's praetorians (Cambridge, 1984), p. 106. 62 Cape Times (9 July 1987); Guardian (London, 3 October 1986). 63 Armaments Development and Production Act, 1980 Amendment, cited in South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey 1980 (Johannesburg, 1981), p. 213. 64 See report and bibliography in George Houser, 'Relations between the United States and South Africa', United Nations Centre Against Apartheid Notes and Documents 84/19358 (August 1984); Kevin Danaher, In whose interest? a guide to US-South African relations (Washington, 1984); Ann Seidman, The roots of crisis in Southern Africa (Trenton, NJ, 1986), pp. 91-114. 65 Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, 'A US policy toward South Africa' (Washington, DC, US Department of State, January 1987). 66 Transcript, ABC World News Tonight (25 February 1987). 67 New York Times (20 August 1987). 68 Ibid. 1 Bjorn Hettne, 'Structural dependence and destabilisation in Central America and the Caribbean', Development and Peace (No. 6, 1985), p. 80. 2 Fred Halliday, The making of the second cold war (London, 1983), p. 246. 3 A June 1985 New York Times /CBS poll cited 53 per cent against funding the con tras. An August 1987 Washington Post /ABC poll found 59 per cent against funding the contras, even after weeks of pro-contra testimony in the congressional hearings on the Iran-contra affair. 4 Joanne Omang, 'A historical background to the CIA's Nicaragua Manual' in the CIA's Nicaragua Manual, Psychological operations in guerrilla warfare (New York, 1985), p. 18. 5 Ibid., p. 19. 6 Barry Munslow, Mozambique: the revolution and its origins (London, 1983), p. 163. 7 Renee Lowensen, speech on Nicaragua, Harare, Zimbabwe, 6 March 1985. 8 AIM (Agencia de Informaçao de Moçambique) Information Bulletin (No. 112, 1985), p. 2. 9 AIM, Information Bulletin (No. 106, 1985), p.11. 10 David Sanders, speech on health care in Nicaragua, Harare, Zimbabwe, (5 March 1985). UNICEF, The state of the world's children 1986 (London, 1985), p. 38. 11 Sheryl Hirshon, A nd also teach them to read (Westport, CT, 1983), p. xi. 12 UN Economic Commission for Latin America, 'Preliminary overview of the Latin American economy during 1983', E/CEPAL/G 1279 (29 December 1983), cited in Martin E. Conroy, 'Economic legacies and policies: performance and critique', in Thomas W. Walker (ed.), Nicaragua: the first five years (New York, 1985), p. 224. 13 In Che Guevara's Guerra de guerrillas , he discusses Augusto Cesar Sandino's strug gle against the US Marines as an antecedent for the Cuban revolutionary movement of the 1950s. Perhaps it was not the Cubans who influenced the Nicaraguans, but the other way around. 'Nicaragua and the socialist countries', NACLA (Vol. 19, no. 3, 1985), p. 33. 14 The Washington Post (16 August 1984). 15 'The other superpower: the Soviet Union and Latin America 1917-1987', NACLA (Vol. 21, no. I, 1987), pp. 10 and 27; and Los Angeles Times (27 June 1987); see also Augusto Varas (ed.), Soviet-Latin American relations in the 1980s . 16 New York Times (20 August 1987). 17 Carol B. Thompson, Challenge to imperialism: the frontline states in the liberation of Zimbabwe (Boulder, 1986), pp. 126-30. 18 Andreas Balogh, 'New features in the Third World policy of the US', Development and Peace (No. 6, 1985), p. 55. Lawrence S. Eagleburger before the House Foreign Relations Committee in July 1981 cited the developing countries 'as the most impor tant areas of the shift in the balance of East-West relations', p. 54. 19 The Nation (16 June 1984), p. 729. 20 Barry Munslow, op. cit., p. 18. 21 David P. Calleo, The imperious economy (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 172-3. 22 Central America Report (Vol. 14, no. 22, 12 June 1987), p. 171. 23 Personal interviews of Frelimo leaders, Maputo, 28 May-4 June 1986. 24 Roy Gutman, 'Nicaragua: America's diplomatic charade', Foreign Policy (No. 56, 1984), p. 16. 25 Central American Bulletin (April 1985), p. 7. Newsweek (17 June 1985), p. 36. 26 Guardian (New York, 6 November 1985), p. 5. 27 Central America Report (Vol. 14, no. 12, 27 March 1987), p. 93; see also Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, 'Indigenous rights and regional autonomy in revolutionary Nicaragua', Latin American Perspectives (Vol. 14, no. 1, 1987), pp. 43-66. 28 Several interviews from eye-witnesses working with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Mozambique; interviews in Harare, Zimbabwe, June-December 1985. 29 Jerry Sanders, 'Terminators', Mother Jones (August-September 1983), pp. 36-41. 30 Africa Confidential (28 November 1984). 31 Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, press statement: 'Conspiracy between FRG and Racist South Africa', (Luanda, 23 May 1985). 32 Internationale de la Résistance, Declaration of Principles and List of Support Com mittee Members, mimeo (4 June 1983); Afrique-Asie (14 January 1985). 33 Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 40. 34 Manchester Guardian Weekly (23 February 1985 and 3 March 1985), both p. 13; Fred Clarkson, 'Privatising the war', Covert Action (No. 22, 1984), pp. 31-3. 35 Guardian (New York, 12 March 1985), p. 3. 36 Ward Churchill, 'Soldier of Fortune's Robert K. Brown', Covert Action, op. cit., p. 13. 37 Fred Clarkson, op. cit., p. 33; also documented in Iran-contra hearings, May-August 1987. 38 Agence France Presse Wireservice (2 January 1985). 39 Fay Hansen, 'The AFL and CIO and the endowment for democracy', Economic Notes (May-June 1985), pp. 12-15. 40 People's Republic of Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 30 and 32. 41 Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Disasters, People's Republic of Mozambique, Natural disasters hamper development (10 March 1985), p. 22. 42 Eye-witnesses report that the MNR continuously target trucks that carry the Red Cross emblem; food trucks, even with military convoys, have also been targeted. 43 Sunday Mail (Harare, 5 December 1985). 44 Allen Isaacman, 'An African war ensnarls the ultra-right', Los Angeles Times (28 June 1987). 45 Financial Gazette (Harare, 20 December 1985). 46 Allen Isaacman, op. cit. 47 See regular reports in AIM Information Bulletins. Confirmed by interviews of representatives of NGOs in Harare, Zimbabwe, October-December 1985. 48 Carlos Fernando Chamorro, 'Disinformation: the other face of the war', Barricada (Vol. 7, no. 248, 16 July 1987), p. 6. AIM, Information Bulletin (no. 133, 1987), p. 9. 49 Reginold H. Green et al, 'Children in Southern Africa', Children on the front line (New York, March 1987). 50 AIM (August 1987), op. cit., p. 10. 51 Bjorn Hettne, op. cit., p. 100. 52 St Louis Post Dispatch (26 July 1987). 53 South (October 1985), p. 40. 54 Quoted documents from Gorongosa Camp, 'Angola and Mozambique under at tack', Resister, Journal of the Committee on South African War Resistance (No. 41, December 1985-January 1986), pp. 9-10. AIM, Information Bulletin (No. 111, 1985), pp. 3-7. 55 Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), Destructive Engagement (Harare, 1986), pp. 36-7. 56 New York Times (4 June 1985). 57 James L. Sundquist, The decline and resurgency of Congress (Washington D.C., 1981 ), pp. 330-332; Cecil V. Crabb, Jr and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to struggle: Con gress, the president and foreign policy (Washington, D.C., 1985), pp. 137-46. 58 Roger Morris, 'Casey's past told us "Fixer" would get us into a fix', Los Angeles Times (28 August 1987). 59 Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan, 'The Carlos file', The Nation (5 October 1985), pp. 311-315; Affidavit of Daniel Sheehan, filed in Federal Court, 12 December 1986 (Washington, DC, 1987). 60 Deon Geldenhuys, The diplomacy of isolation: South African foreign policy mak ing (Johannesburg, 1984), p. 92. 61 Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's praetorians (Cambridge, 1984), p. 106. 62 Cape Times (9 July 1987); Guardian (London, 3 October 1986). 63 Armaments Development and Production Act, 1980 Amendment, cited in South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey 1980 (Johannesburg, 1981), p. 213. 64 See report and bibliography in George Houser, 'Relations between the United States and South Africa', United Nations Centre Against Apartheid Notes and Documents 84/19358 (August 1984); Kevin Danaher, In whose interest? a guide to US-South African relations (Washington, 1984); Ann Seidman, The roots of crisis in Southern Africa (Trenton, NJ, 1986), pp. 91-114. 65 Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, 'A US policy toward South Africa' (Washington, DC, US Department of State, January 1987). 66 Transcript, ABC World News Tonight (25 February 1987). 67 New York Times (20 August 1987). 68 Ibid.

PY - 1988/4

Y1 - 1988/4

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U2 - 10.1177/030639688802900402

DO - 10.1177/030639688802900402

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AN - SCOPUS:0024190574

SN - 0306-3968

VL - 29

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JO - Race & Class

JF - Race & Class

IS - 4

ER -