The genuine attitude view of fictional belief

Wesley Buckwalter, Katherine Tullmann

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

The distinct-attitude view of fictional narratives is a standard position in contemporary aesthetics. This is the view that cognitive attitudes formed in response to fictions are a distinct kind of mental state from beliefs formed in response to non-fictional scenarios, such as pretend or imaginary states. This chapter argues that the balance of functional, behavioral, and neuroscientific evidence best supports the genuine-attitude view of belief. According to the genuine-attitude view, cognitive responses to fictions are genuine beliefs that are not a distinct kind of mental state from the beliefs that we form in response to non-fictional scenarios. The chapter considers the implications of the genuine-attitude view for debates at the intersection of epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationArt and Belief
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages194-209
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9780198805403
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 23 2017
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Attitudes
  • Belief
  • Fiction
  • Functional role
  • Imagination
  • Motivation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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