Statistical Analysis of ReRAM-PUF Based Keyless Encryption Protocol Against Frequency Analysis Attack

Dina Ghanai Miandaob, Sareh Assiri, Joseph Mihaljevic, Bertrand Cambou

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

There has been a growing interest in fully integrating Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) for cryptographic primitives, or keyless encryption. Keyless primitives do not store key information during the entire encryption and decryption phase, providing full security against volatile and non-volatile memory attacks. The concept of keyless encryption using ReRAM PUF is a relatively new concept, and the security aspect of the protocol has not been tested yet. In this paper, we use statistical models to analyze the randomness of the protocol and its resistance against frequency attacks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAdvances in Information and Communication - Proceedings of the 2022 Future of Information and Communication Conference, FICC
EditorsKohei Arai
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages928-940
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9783030980146
DOIs
StatePublished - 2022
EventFuture of Information and Communication Conference, FICC 2022 - Virtual, Online
Duration: Mar 3 2022Mar 4 2022

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Networks and Systems
Volume439 LNNS
ISSN (Print)2367-3370
ISSN (Electronic)2367-3389

Conference

ConferenceFuture of Information and Communication Conference, FICC 2022
CityVirtual, Online
Period3/3/223/4/22

Keywords

  • Binomial distribution
  • Keyless encryption
  • Leave-one-out cross-validation
  • Physically Unclonable Functions
  • ReRAM

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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