TY - CHAP
T1 - Response-based cryptographic methods with ternary physical unclonable functions
AU - Cambou, Bertrand
AU - Philabaum, Christopher
AU - Booher, Duane
AU - Telesca, Donald A.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are used as hardware fingerprints for access control, and authentication in mobile and wireless networks and Internet of Things. However, it is challenging to use PUFs to extract cryptographic keys, because a single bit mismatch in the keys is not acceptable to most encryption algorithms. PUFs are aging; they are sensitive to temperature drifts, and other environmental effects. Successful implementation of PUFs, as key generators, requires power hungry error correcting schemes that add latency, and vulnerability to attacks such as differential power analysis. This work proposes methods to generate cryptographic keys directly from the un-corrected responses of the PUFs. The secure server, driving the network, manages the differences between the PUF responses and the original PUF challenges, through matching algorithms, mitigating the need to use heavy error correction schemes. In these methods, both the server and the client devices independently generate the exact same un-corrected responses of the PUF. These responses are therefore suitable for cryptographic protocols such as public key infrastructure or highly secure ledger protecting blockchain technology. The method presented in this paper, which is based on ternary PUFs, was successfully implemented and tested in a PC environment.
AB - Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are used as hardware fingerprints for access control, and authentication in mobile and wireless networks and Internet of Things. However, it is challenging to use PUFs to extract cryptographic keys, because a single bit mismatch in the keys is not acceptable to most encryption algorithms. PUFs are aging; they are sensitive to temperature drifts, and other environmental effects. Successful implementation of PUFs, as key generators, requires power hungry error correcting schemes that add latency, and vulnerability to attacks such as differential power analysis. This work proposes methods to generate cryptographic keys directly from the un-corrected responses of the PUFs. The secure server, driving the network, manages the differences between the PUF responses and the original PUF challenges, through matching algorithms, mitigating the need to use heavy error correction schemes. In these methods, both the server and the client devices independently generate the exact same un-corrected responses of the PUF. These responses are therefore suitable for cryptographic protocols such as public key infrastructure or highly secure ledger protecting blockchain technology. The method presented in this paper, which is based on ternary PUFs, was successfully implemented and tested in a PC environment.
KW - Access control
KW - Cryptography
KW - Mobile security
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85062923544&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85062923544&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-12385-7_55
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-12385-7_55
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85062923544
T3 - Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems
SP - 781
EP - 800
BT - Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems
PB - Springer
ER -