TY - JOUR
T1 - Private Financing of the Military
T2 - Local Political Economy Approach
AU - Jaskoski, Maiah
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments I thank Candelaria Garay, Stephanie McNulty, Arturo Sotomayor, Harold Trinkunas, and two anonymous SCID reviewers for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper. Letitia Lawson and Michael Malley provided invaluable guidance on the Nigerian and Indonesian cases, respectively. The study would not have been possible without the generosity of many individuals in Ecuador and Peru who shared with me their time and views, and for their help, I am deeply grateful. Fieldwork was supported by a National Security Education Program David L. Boren Graduate Fellowship and the Naval Postgraduate School Research Initiation Program. The findings presented here are those of the author and do not represent positions of the US navy, defense department, or government.
PY - 2013/6
Y1 - 2013/6
N2 - In developing countries that are democratizing after military rule, and undergoing liberalizing economic reforms that encourage a shrinking of the state, what missions are the armed forces performing, who funds those missions, who benefits from military services, and why? This article analyzes security provision by the armed forces for paying clients-especially private companies in extractive industries-in accordance with negotiations between clients and commanders of the local military units that directly provide the security. The analysis identifies two paths toward local military-client relations. First, weak state capacity may mean that government control of military finances brought by democratization and economic reform remains limited to the national level, promoting local military-client exchanges. Second, amid minimal government control of military finances, even in the capital city, demand from companies in the powerful extractive industries and from recently endowed subnational governments can encourage local military-client contracting.
AB - In developing countries that are democratizing after military rule, and undergoing liberalizing economic reforms that encourage a shrinking of the state, what missions are the armed forces performing, who funds those missions, who benefits from military services, and why? This article analyzes security provision by the armed forces for paying clients-especially private companies in extractive industries-in accordance with negotiations between clients and commanders of the local military units that directly provide the security. The analysis identifies two paths toward local military-client relations. First, weak state capacity may mean that government control of military finances brought by democratization and economic reform remains limited to the national level, promoting local military-client exchanges. Second, amid minimal government control of military finances, even in the capital city, demand from companies in the powerful extractive industries and from recently endowed subnational governments can encourage local military-client contracting.
KW - Civil-military relations
KW - Resource conflict
KW - Security privatization
KW - State capture
KW - Subnational politics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84877696169&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84877696169&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s12116-012-9119-2
DO - 10.1007/s12116-012-9119-2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84877696169
SN - 0039-3606
VL - 48
SP - 172
EP - 195
JO - Studies in Comparative International Development
JF - Studies in Comparative International Development
IS - 2
ER -