TY - JOUR
T1 - Post quantum cryptographic keys generated with physical unclonable functions
AU - Cambou, Bertrand
AU - Gowanlock, Michael
AU - Yildiz, Bahattin
AU - Ghanaimiandoab, Dina
AU - Lee, Kaitlyn
AU - Nelson, Stefan
AU - Philabaum, Christopher
AU - Stenberg, Alyssa
AU - Wright, Jordan
N1 - Funding Information:
This material is based upon the work funded by the Information Directorate under AFRL award number FA8750-19-2-0503. The authors thank the staff, students, and faculty from Northern Arizona University (NAU) in particular, Brandon Salter who is a software engineer in NAU’s cybersecurity lab. We also thank the professionals of the Information Directorate of the Air Force Research laboratory (AFRL) of Rome, New York (US), who supported this effort. disclaimer: (a) Contractor acknowledges Government’s support in the publication of this paper. This material is partially based upon the work funded by the Information Directorate, under the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL); (b) any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of AFRL.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
PY - 2021/3/2
Y1 - 2021/3/2
N2 - Lattice and code cryptography can replace existing schemes such as elliptic curve cryptography because of their resistance to quantum computers. In support of public key infrastructures, the distribution, validation and storage of the cryptographic keys is then more complex for handling longer keys. This paper describes practical ways to generate keys from physical unclonable func-tions, for both lattice and code-based cryptography. Handshakes between client devices containing the physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and a server are used to select sets of addressable positions in the PUFs, from which streams of bits called seeds are generated on demand. The public and private cryptographic key pairs are computed from these seeds together with additional streams of random numbers. The method allows the server to independently validate the public key generated by the PUF, and act as a certificate authority in the network. Technologies such as high performance computing, and graphic processing units can further enhance security by preventing attackers from making this independent validation when only equipped with less powerful computers.
AB - Lattice and code cryptography can replace existing schemes such as elliptic curve cryptography because of their resistance to quantum computers. In support of public key infrastructures, the distribution, validation and storage of the cryptographic keys is then more complex for handling longer keys. This paper describes practical ways to generate keys from physical unclonable func-tions, for both lattice and code-based cryptography. Handshakes between client devices containing the physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and a server are used to select sets of addressable positions in the PUFs, from which streams of bits called seeds are generated on demand. The public and private cryptographic key pairs are computed from these seeds together with additional streams of random numbers. The method allows the server to independently validate the public key generated by the PUF, and act as a certificate authority in the network. Technologies such as high performance computing, and graphic processing units can further enhance security by preventing attackers from making this independent validation when only equipped with less powerful computers.
KW - Code cryptography
KW - High performance computing
KW - Lattice cryptography
KW - Physical un-clonable function
KW - Post quantum cryptography
KW - Public key infrastructure
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U2 - 10.3390/app11062801
DO - 10.3390/app11062801
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85103518929
SN - 2076-3417
VL - 11
JO - Applied Sciences (Switzerland)
JF - Applied Sciences (Switzerland)
IS - 6
M1 - 2801
ER -