@article{151ec3c89ea74bac8fe2fb53b9b493ec,
title = "Democracy promotion and electoral quality: A disaggregated analysis",
abstract = "The international community spends significant sums of money on democracy promotion, focusing especially on producing competitive and transparent electoral environments. In theory, aid empowers a variety of actors, increasing competition and government responsiveness. We argue that to fully understand the effect of aid on democratization one must consider how democracy aid affects specific country institutions. Building on theory from the democratization and democracy promotion literature, we specify more precise causal linkages between democracy assistance and elections. Specifically, we hypothesize about the effects of democracy aid on the implementation and quality of elections. Building on canonical work, we test these hypotheses, using V-Dem's detailed elections measures to examine the impact of democracy aid. Intriguingly, we find that there is no consistent relationship between democracy and governance aid and the improvement of disaggregated indicators of election quality, but aggregate measures still capture a relationship. We suggest that current evidence is more consistent with election-enhancing aid following democratization than with democratization following such aid.",
author = "Steele, {Carie A.} and Daniel Pemstein and Meserve, {Stephen A.}",
note = "Funding Information: National Science Foundation, Grant/Award Number: SES‐1423944; Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant/Award Number: M13‐0559:1 Funding information Funding Information: The authors thank three anonymous reviewers and editor Adam Sheingate for their productive comments and suggestions. The authors presented a draft of this article at the 2016 annual conference of the American Political Science Association and the 2018 V‐Dem annual conference and wish to thank Michael Coppedge, Anna L{\"u}hrmann and other seminar participants for their helpful feedback. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES‐1423944 (PI: Daniel Pemstein) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond under Grant No. M13‐0559:1 (PI: Staffan Lindberg). Data and code necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article and Supporting Information are available in Harvard Dataverse ( https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NQGFWJ ). 1 Funding Information: The authors thank three anonymous reviewers and editor Adam Sheingate for their productive comments and suggestions. The authors presented a draft of this article at the 2016 annual conference of the American Political Science Association and the 2018 V-Dem annual conference and wish to thank Michael Coppedge, Anna L?hrmann and other seminar participants for their helpful feedback. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-1423944 (PI: Daniel Pemstein) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond under Grant No. M13-0559:1 (PI: Staffan Lindberg). Data and code necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article and Supporting Information are available in Harvard Dataverse (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NQGFWJ). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Wiley Periodicals LLC.",
year = "2021",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1111/gove.12526",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "34",
pages = "505--521",
journal = "Governance",
issn = "0952-1895",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",
}