Congressional policy preferences and U.S. monetary policy

Marc C. Chopin, C. Steven Cole, Michael A. Ellis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


This paper shows that the evidence of congressional impotence in influencing U.S. monetary policy presented in Chopin et al. (1996) is robust to inclusion of a dummy variable for the tenure of House Banking Committee Chairman Wright Patman. This result is in contrast to the assertion of Grier (1996). Further, we show that specification problems of models of congressional influence over a sample period that extends beyond the mid-1980s can be the result of omitted variable bias. When macroeconomic variables, including oil price shocks, are included in the model, our results continue to hold. Contrasting our results with Grier's indicates that the evidence concerning congressional influence is sensitive to the measure of congressional preferences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)581-585
Number of pages5
JournalJournal of Monetary Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 1996


  • Congressional influence
  • Monetary policy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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